Secure Blind Decryption

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Abstract

In this work we construct public key encryption schemes that admit a protocol for *blindly* decrypting ciphertexts. In a blind decryption protocol, a user with a ciphertext interacts with a secret keyholder such that the user obtains the decryption of the ciphertext and the keyholder learns nothing about what it decrypted. While we are not the first to consider this problem, previous works provided only weak security guarantees against malicious users. We provide, to our knowledge, the first practical blind decryption schemes that are secure under a strong CCA security definition. We prove our construction secure in the standard model under simple, well-studied assumptions in bilinear groups. To motivate the usefulness of this primitive we discuss several applications including privacy-preserving distributed file systems and Oblivious Transfer schemes that admit *public* contribution.

Keywords: public-key encryption, privacy-preserving protocols, signatures, bilinear maps.

1 Introduction

The past several years have seen a trend towards outsourcing data storage to remote data stores and cloud-based services. While much attention has been paid to securing this data, relatively little has been given to obscuring the way that the data is accessed. This is a real problem for some systems where users' access histories are more sensitive than the data itself, for example patent databases. Even outside of these cases there are many practical applications where users' access history is sensitive. For example, the data access patterns of a corporation's executives could be worth millions of dollars to the right person, particularly in advance of a merger or IPO.

To address these concerns, many recent works have proposed tools that allow allow users to transact online without sacrificing their privacy. These tools include (but are not limited to) efficient adaptive oblivious transfer protocols [16, 29, 30, 48], anonymous credential schemes [14, 4], and group signature schemes [17, 7]. One recent application for these tools is to the construction of *oblivious databases* that provide strong access control while preventing the operator from learning which records its users access [21, 13]. Despite this progress, there are still many primitives that we do not know how to implement efficiently using the techniques available to us.

Blind Decryption. In this work we consider one such primitive, which we refer to as *blind decryption*. A blind decryption scheme is a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme that admits an efficient protocol for obliviously decrypting ciphertexts. In this protocol a User who possesses a ciphertext interacts with a Decryptor who holds the necessary secret key. At the conclusion of the protocol, the User obtains the plaintext while the Decryptor learns nothing about what it decrypted. Since in practice, the fundamental characteristic of a blind decryption scheme is its decryption protocol, it seems reasonable to analyze this protocol with malicious adversaries in mind. Specifically, since such an adversary can implicitly use the blind decryption protocol to decrypt chosen ciphertexts, we will restrict out investigation to secure blind decryption schemes that retain their security even under (adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack.

Blind decryption has many applications to privacy-preserving protocols and systems. For example, blind decryption implies k-out-of-N oblivious transfer [12], which is important theoretically as well as practically for its applications to the construction of oblivious databases [16, 21, 13]. Moreover, blind decryption has practical applications to distributed cryptographic filesystems and for supporting rapid deletion [47].

We are not the first to consider the problem of constructing blind decryption schemes. The primitive was originally formalized by Sakura and Yamane [49] in the mid-1990s, but folklore solutions are thought to have predated that work by more than a decade. Despite an abundance of research in this area, most proposed constructions are insecure under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack [25, 53, 43, 24, 51, 46]. Several protocols have recently been proposed containing "blind decryption-like" techniques (see *e.g.,* the simulatable oblivious transfer protocols of [16, 30, 48, 31, 35]). However, these protocols use symmetric (or at least, non-public) encryption procedures, and it does not seem easy to adapt them to the public-key model.

Of course, blind decryption is an instance of secure multi-party computation (MPC) and can be achieved by applying general techniques (*e.g.,* [54, 28, 36]) to the decryption algorithm of a CCA-secure PKE scheme. However, the protocols yielded by this approach are likely to be quite inefficient, making them impractical for real-world applications.

Our Contributions. In this paper we present what is, to our knowledge, the first practical blind decryption scheme that is IND-CCA2-secure in the standard model. We prove our scheme secure under reasonable assumptions in bilinear groups. At the cost of introducing an optional Common Reference String, the protocol can be conducted in a single communication round.

To motivate the usefulness of this new primitive we consider several applications. Chief among these is the construction of privacy-preserving encrypted filesystems (and databases), where a central authority manages the decryption of many ciphertexts without learning users' access patterns. This is important in situations where the access pattern might leak critical information about the information being accessed. Unlike previous attempts to solve this problem [16, 21, 13], our encryption algorithm is *public*, *i.e.,* users can encrypt new messages offline without assistance from a trusted party. By combining blind decryption with the new oblivious access control techiques of [21, 13] (which use anonymous credentials to enforce complex access control policies) we can achieve strong proactive access control without sacrificing privacy.

Of potential theoretical interest, blind decryption can be used as a building block in constructing adaptive k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocols [16, 30, 48, 31, 35, 39]. In fact, it is possible to achieve a multi-party primitive that is more flexible than traditional OT, in that *any* party can commit messages to the message database (rather than just the Sender). We refer to this enhanced primitive as Oblivious Transfer with Public Contribution (OTPC). We discuss these applications in Section 5.

1.1 Related Work

The first blind decryption protocol is generally attributed Chaum [20], who proposed a technique for blinding an RSA ciphertext in order to obtain its decryption $c^d \ mod \ N$. Since traditional RSA ciphertexts are malleable and hence vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attack, this approach does not lead to a secure blind decryption scheme. Furthermore, standard encryption padding techniques [5] do not seem helpful.

Subsequent works [49, 25, 53] adapted Chaum's approach to other CPA-secure cryptosystems such as Elgamal. These constructions were employed within various protocols, including a 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer scheme due to Dodis *et al.* [25]. Unfortunately, since the cryptosystems underlying these protocols are not CCA-secure, security analyses of those protocols frequently required strong assumptions such as honest-but-curious adversaries.[1] Mambo, Sakurai and Okamoto [43] proposed to address chosen ciphertext attacks by signing the ciphertexts to prevent an adversary from mauling them. Their *transformable signature* could be blinded in tandem with the ciphertext. The trouble with this approach and other related approaches [16, 30, 31, 35, 48] is that the encryption scheme is no longer a PKE, since encryption now

[1] For example, Dodis *et al.* [25] analyzed their 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer construction in the honest-but-curious model. However, the authors informally proposed to deal with malicious adversaries by having the OT Receiver prove in zero-knowledge that each ciphertext to be decrypted belongs to an honestly-generated set published by the Sender. Using traditional techniques, such a proof typically requires $O(N)$ effort [50, 22]. More fundamentally, this approach does not extend to more complex protocols, since it assumes that there is only one (trusted) party performing all encryption.

requires a knowledge of a secret signing key (furthermore, these transformable signatures were successfully cryptanalyzed [24]). Schnorr and Jakobsson [51] proposed a scheme secure under the weaker *one-more decryption attack* and used this to construct a PIR protocol. Unfortunately, their protocol is secure only for *random* messages, and furthermore cannot be extended to construct stronger primitives such as simulatable OT [16].

Recently, Green and Hohenberger [29] proposed a technique for blindly extracting decryption keys in an Identity-Based Encryption scheme. Subsequently, Ogata and Le Trieu [46] used this tool to obtain a weak blind decryption scheme (by encrypting ciphertexts under a random identity, then blindly extracting the appropriate secret key). The resulting protocol is efficient, but the ciphertexts are malleable and thus vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

1.2 Intuition

Ideally the development of a blind decryption scheme would begin with an existing CCA-secure PKE, and would only require us to develop an efficient two-party protocol for computing the decryption algorithm. Indeed, the literature provides us with many candidate PKE constructions that can be so adapted if we are willing to accept the costs associated with general multi-party computation techniques [54, 28, 36].

However, in this work we are interested in protocols that are both secure and *practical*. This rules out inefficient gate-by-gate decryption protocols, limiting us to a relatively small collection of techniques that can be used to build efficient protocols. This toolbox includes primitives such as homomorphic commitment schemes, which we might combine with zero knowledge proofs for statements involving algebraic relations among cyclic group elements, *e.g.,* [50, 32]. While these techniques have been deployed successfully to construct other privacy-preserving protocols, there are strict limitations on what they can accomplish.

To illustrate this point, let us review several of the most popular encryption techniques in the literature. Random oracle paradigms such as OAEP [5] and Fujisaki-Okamoto [27] seem fundamentally difficult to adapt, since these approaches require the decryptor to evaluate an ideal hash function on a partially-decrypted value *prior* to outputting a result. Even the more efficient standard-model CCA-secure paradigms such as Cramer-Shoup [23] and recent bilinear constructions (*e.g.,* [8, 10, 37]) require components that we cannot efficiently adapt. For example, when implemented in a group $\mathbb{G}$ of order p, the Cramer-Shoup scheme assumes a collision-resistant mapping $H : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. We know of no efficient two-party technique for evaluating such a function.[2]

Our approach. Rather than adapt an existing scheme, we set out to design a new one. Our approach is based on the TBE-to-PKE paradigm proposed independently by Canetti *et al.* [19] and MacKenzie *et al.* [42]. This technique converts a Tag-Based Encryption (TBE) scheme into a CCA-secure public PKE with the assistance of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature (OTS). In this generic transform, encryption is conducted by first generating a keypair (vk, sk) for the OTS, encrypting the message using the TBE with vk as the tag, then signing the resulting ciphertext with sk. Intuitively the presence of the signature (which is verified at decryption time) prevents an adversary from mauling the ciphertext.

To blindly decrypt such a ciphertext, we propose the following approach: the User first commits to the ciphertext and vk using a homomorphic commitment or encryption scheme. She then efficiently proves knowledge of the associated signature for these committed values. If this proof verifies, the Decryptor may then apply the TBE decryption algorithm to the (homomorphically) committed ciphertext, secure in the knowledge that the commitment contains an appropriately-distributed value. Finally, the result can be opened by the User.

For this protocol to be efficient, we must choose our underlying primitives with care. Specifically, we must ensure that (1) the OTS verification key maps to the tag-space of the TBE, (2) and the TBE ciphertext maps to the message space of the OTS. Of course, the easiest way to achieve these goals is to use an OTS that directly signs the TBE ciphertext space, with a TBE whose tag-space includes the OTS verification keyspace. These primitives must admit efficient protocols for the operations we will conduct with them.

[2] Conceivably it might be possible to develop one, however it might be tied to the specific construction of $\mathbb{G}$ and thus be be quite inflexible.

Finally, we would like to avoid relying on complex or novel complexity assumptions in order to achieve these goals.

Our proposed construction is based on a variant of Cramer-Shoup that was adapted by Shacham [52] for security in bilinear groups. We first modify Shacham's construction into a TBE with the following ciphertext structure. Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ be an arbitrary ciphertext tag and $m \in \mathbb{G}$ a message to be encrypted. Given a public key $g, g_1, g_2, g_3, h_1, h_2, c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ an encryptor selects random elements $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and outputs the ciphertext:

$$(u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk) \quad = \quad (g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, g_3^{r_1+r_2}, m \cdot h_1^{r_1} h_2^{r_2}, (c_1 d_1^{\alpha})^{r_1} \cdot (c_2 d_2^{\alpha})^{r_2}, g^{\alpha})$$

An important feature of this construction is that the decryptor does *not* need to know the tag value α.[3] Therefore, in constructing our PKE we can "dual-purpose" α as both the ciphertext tag *and* as the secret key of a one-time signature (OTS) scheme. Specifically, our encryption process will select a random α, encrypt the message using the TBE with α as the tag, and finally sign the resulting elements (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v) under α. The resulting ciphertext contains $(u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk)$ along with the signature on those values.

The remaining challenge is therefore to construct an efficient OTS that can sign multiple bilinear group elements, yet admits an efficient proof-of-knowledge for a signature on committed elements. To address this we propose a new multi-block one-time "F-signature" that we believe may be of independent interest.[4] Interestingly, our signing algorithm does not actually operate on elements of $\mathbb{G}$, but rather signs message vectors of the form $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{*n}$ (for some arbitrary vector length n). Once a message is signed, however, the signature can be *verified* given the tuple $(g^{m_1}, \ldots, g^{m_n}) \in \mathbb{G}^n$, rather than the original message vector. Strictly speaking, this construction does not meet our requirements—an encryptor won't always know the discrete logarithm base g of (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v). Our key insight is to show that encryptors can produce an identically distributed "workalike" signature even when the discrete logarithms are not known. We prove that, in the context of our encryption scheme, no adversary can forge these workalike signatures. Our signature construction is presented independently in Appendix 2.4.

2 Technical Preliminaries

We will now recall some basic building blocks.

2.1 Bilinear Groups and Cryptographic Assumptions

Let λ be a security parameter. We define $\mathsf{BMsetup}$ as an algorithm that, on input 1^λ, outputs the parameters for a bilinear mapping as $\gamma = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g \in \mathbb{G})$, where g generates $\mathbb{G}$, the groups $\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T$ each have prime order p, and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$. For $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle = \mathbb{G}$ the efficiently-computable mapping e must be both *non-degenerate* ($\langle e(g,h) \rangle = \mathbb{G}_T$) and *bilinear* (for $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $e(g^a, h^b) = e(g,h)^{ab}$).

The Decision Linear Assumption (DLIN) [7]. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order $p \in \Theta(2^\lambda)$. For all p.p.t. adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is $1/2$ plus an amount negligible in λ:

$$\Pr[f, g, h, z_0 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}; a, b \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*; z_1 \leftarrow h^{a+b}; d \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}; \\ d' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(f, g, h, f^a, g^b, z_d) : d = d'].$$

The Flexible Diffie-Hellman Assumption (FDH) [38, 31]. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order $p \in \Theta(2^\lambda)$. For all p.p.t. adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is negligible in λ:

$$\Pr[g, g^a, g^b; a, b \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*; (w, w') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(g, g^a, g^b) : w \neq 1 \ \wedge \ w' = w^{ab}].$$

[3] This differs from many other candidate TBE and IBE schemes, *e.g.,* Boneh and Boyen's IBE [6] and Kiltz's TBE [37] where the tag/identity is an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and *must* be provided at decryption time (or in the case of IBE, when a secret key is extracted). This requirement stems from the nature of those schemes' security proofs.

[4] F-signature is a contraction of F-unforgeable signature, which is a concept proposed by Belinkiy *et al.* [4], and later developed by Green and Hohenberger [31]. In this paradigm, the signing algorithm operates on a message m, but there exists a signature verification algorithm that can operate given only $F(m)$ for some one-way function F.

This assumption was previously described as the 2-out-of-3 CDH assumption by Kunz-Jacques and Pointcheval [38]. We adopt the name Flexible Diffie-Hellman for consistency with recent work [41, 26, 31]. To instill confidence in this assumption, Green and Hohenberger [31] showed that a solver for the Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem implies a solver for a related decisional problem, the Decisional 3-Party Diffie-Hellman assumption (3DDH) which has been used several times in the literature [40, 9, 33, 31]. An adversary solves the 3DDH problem if, given (g, g^a, g^b, g^c, z) for some random $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, it outputs 1 if $z = g^{abc}$ and 0 otherwise.

2.2 Proofs of Knowledge

We use several standard results for proving statements about the satisfiability of one or more pairing-product equations. For variables $\{\mathcal{X}\}_{1\ldots n} \in \mathbb{G}$ and constants $\{\mathcal{A}\}_{1\ldots n} \in \mathbb{G}, a_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and $t_T \in \mathbb{G}_T$, these equations have the form:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(\mathcal{A}_i, \mathcal{X}_i) \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{j=1}^{n} e(\mathcal{X}_i, \mathcal{X}_j)^{a_{i,j}} = t_T$$

The proof-of-knowledge protocols in this work can be instantiated using one of two approaches. The first approach is to use the interactive zero-knowledge proof technique of Schnorr [50], with extensions due to *e.g.,* [22, 15, 18, 11, 2, 16]. Note that this may require that the proofs be executed sequentially (indeed, this requirement is explicit in our security definitions). For details, see the work of Adida *et al.* [2], which provides a taxonomy of interactive proof techniques for pairing-based statements.

Alternatively, the proofs can be instantiated using the Groth-Sahai proof system [32] which permits efficient non-interactive proofs of the satisfiability of multiple pairing product equations. In the general case these proofs are witness indistinguishable. However a subset of special cases (including where $t_T = 1$) may be conducted in zero-knowledge.[5] The Groth-Sahai system can be instantiated under the Decision Linear assumption in the Common Reference String model. An important limitation of the Groth-Sahai proof system has to do with the knowledge extractor used to show proof soundness: specifically, the extractor can only extract elements of the bilinear image group $\mathbb{G}$ (not $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ or $\mathbb{G}_T$). We have designed our constructions with this restriction in mind. We refer the reader to [32] for further details.

We refer the reader to the cited works for formal security definitions of ZK and WI proof systems. In our security analysis we will assume some generic instantiation Π_{ZK} that is secure under the Decision Linear assumption in $\mathbb{G}$. Either of the techniques mentioned above can satisfy this requirement. When referring to WI and ZK proofs we will use the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [17]. For instance, $\mathsf{WIPoK}\{(g, h) : e(g, h) = T \wedge e(g, v) = 1\}$ denotes a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of elements g and h that satisfy both $e(g, h) = T$ and $e(g, v) = 1$. All values not in enclosed in ()'s are assumed to be known to the verifier.

2.3 Linear Encryption

Our blind decryption protocol employs a multiplicatively homomorphic scheme that encrypts elements of $\mathbb{G}$. We instantiate this scheme with the Linear Encryption scheme of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [7] which is semantically secure under the Decision Linear assumption. The scheme consists of the following algorithms:

LE.KG. On input a group description γ, pick $h \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$, $x, y \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $f = h^{1/x}, g = h^{1/y}$ and output $pk = (f, g, h)$, $sk = (x, y)$.

LE.Enc. On input pk and a message $m \in \mathbb{G}$, select $a, b \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and output $(c_1, c_2, c_3) = (f^a, g^b, mh^{a+b})$.

LE.Dec. On input $sk, (c_1, c_2, c_3)$, output $m' = c_3/(c_1^x c_2^y)$.

[5] In many cases it is easy to re-write pairing products equation as a composition of multiple distinct equations having $t_T = 1$ (see [32]). Although we do not explicitly perform this translation in our protocols, we note that it can be applied to all of the ZKPoKs used in our constructions.

The homomorphic operation is simple pairwise multiplication, and exponentiation by a scalar z can be performed as c_1^z, c_2^z, c_3^z. To re-randomize a ciphertext one multiplies it by $\mathsf{LE.Enc}(pk, 1)$.

Our protocols require an efficient ZK proof-of-knowledge of the plaintext m underlying a ciphertext C, which we denote by $\mathsf{ZKPoK}\{(m) : C \in \mathsf{LE.Enc}(pk, m)\}$. This can be expressed via the following pairing product equation:

$$\mathsf{ZKPoK}\{(h^a, h^b) : e(h^a, f) = e(c_1, h) \ \wedge \ e(h^b, g) = e(c_2, h)\}$$

Knowledge of m is implicit in this proof, since $m = c_3/(h^a h^b) = c_3/(c_1^x c_2^y)$.[6]

2.4 A One-Time F-Signature on Multiblock Messages

Our constructions require a strongly unforgeable one-time F-signature scheme that signs messages of the form $(m_1, \ldots, m_N) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{*n}$ (for arbitrary values of n), but can *verify* signatures given only a function of the messages, specifically, $(g_1^{m_1}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n}) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ for fixed $g_1, \ldots, g_n \in \mathbb{G}$. Note that $g_1, \ldots, g_n$ need not be distinct.

To construct FS, we adapt a weakly-unforgeable signature due to Green and Hohenberger [31] to admit multi-block messages, while simplifying the scheme into a one-time signature. The latter modification has the incidental effect of strengthening the signature to be strongly unforgeable. Let us now describe FS:

$\mathsf{FS.KG}$. On input group parameters γ, a vector length n, select g, g_1, …, g_n, v, d, u_1, …, $u_n \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$ and $a \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Output $vk = (\gamma, g, g^a, v, d, g_1, \ldots, g_n, u_1, \ldots, u_n, n)$ and $sk = (vk, a)$.

$\mathsf{FS.Sign}$. Given sk and a message vector $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{*n}$, first select $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and output the signature $\sigma = ((\prod_{i=1}^n u_i^{m_i} \cdot v^r \ d)^a, g_1^{am_1}, \ldots, g_n^{am_n}, u_1^{m_1}, \ldots, u_n^{m_n}, r)$.

$\mathsf{FS.Verify}$. Given $pk, (g_1^{m_1}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n})$, parse $\sigma = (\sigma_1, e_1, \ldots, e_n, f_1, \ldots, f_n, r)$, output 1 if the following holds:

$$e(\sigma_1, g) = e(\prod_{i=1}^n f_i \cdot v^r d, g^a) \ \wedge \ \{e(g_i^{m_i}, g^a) = e(e_i, g) \ \wedge \ e(g_i^{m_i}, u_i) = e(g_i, f_i)\}_{i \in [1,n]}$$

Note that verification is a pairing product equation. Thus we can efficiently prove knowledge of a signature using the techniques described in Section 2.2.[7] We denote such a proof by *e.g.,* $\mathsf{WIPoK}\{(\sigma) : \mathsf{Verify}(vk, (g^{m_1}, \ldots, g^{m_n}), \sigma) = 1\}$. Note that vk or the messages may reside within a commitment.

For the special case of single-block messages (where $n = 1$) we can completely omit the value e_1 from the signature. Additionally, note that in practice the values $(g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ need not be distinct. In fact, in our constructions of Section 4 we will employ parameters where one or more of these values is equal to g.

In Appendix A we provide definitions of security, and prove that the scheme $(\mathsf{FS.KG}, \mathsf{FS.Sign}, \mathsf{FS.Verify})$ is strongly unforgeable under the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Workalike signatures. Our blind decryption constructions make use of the "workalike" algorithms $(\mathsf{WAKG}, \mathsf{WASign})$. While the outputs of these algorithms are identically distributed those of KG and Sign, the WASign algorithm operates on messages of the form $(g_1, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$. We stress that $(\mathsf{WAKG}, \mathsf{WASign}, \mathsf{Verify})$ is not a secure signature scheme on arbitrary group elements, but can be used securely under the special conditions of our constructions..

$\mathsf{FS.WAKG}$. Select $x_1, \ldots, x_n \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and set $(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = (g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n})$. Compute the remaining elements as in KG and set $sk = (vk, a, x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

$\mathsf{FS.WASign}$. Given a message vector $(h_1, \ldots, h_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$, first select $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and output the signature $\sigma = ((\prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{x_i} \cdot v^r d)^a, h_1^a, \ldots, h_n^a, h_1^{x_1}, \ldots, h_n^{x_n}, r)$.

[6] If using the Groth-Sahai proof system, this proof must be expanded to *e.g.,* $\mathsf{ZKPoK}\{(h^a, h^b, h') : e(h^a, f)e(c_1^{-1}, h') = 1 \ \wedge \ e(h^b, g)e(c_2^{-1}, h') = 1 \ \wedge \ e(h', h) = e(h, h)\}$.

[7] This proof can be conducted natively using Schnorr-type techniques. Unfortunately, the equivalent proof in the Groth-Sahai system may be more complicated, since that system's knowledge extractor cannot extract the element $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ on which the signature's security depends. Fortunately, the prover can instead prove knowledge of $(h_1, h_2) = (g^{ar}, g^r)$ derived from r, and use the following revised verification check: $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(\prod_{i=1}^n f_i \cdot d, g^a)e(h_1, v) \ \wedge e(h_1, g) = e(h_2, g^a) \ \wedge \ \{e(g^{m_i}, g^a) = e(e_i, g) \ \wedge \ e(g^{m_i}, u_i) = e(f_i, g)\}_{i \in [1,n]}$.

3 Definitions

Notation: Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the message space and $\mathcal{C}$ be the ciphertext space. We write $P(\mathcal{A}(a), \mathcal{B}(b)) \to (c, d)$ to indicate the protocol P is between parties $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$, where a is $\mathcal{A}$'s input, c is $\mathcal{A}$'s output, b is $\mathcal{B}$'s input and d is $\mathcal{B}$'s output. We will define $\nu(\cdot)$ as a negligible function.

Definition 3.1 (Blind Decryption Scheme) A public-key blind decryption scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ and a protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}$.

$\mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$. On input a security parameter λ, the key generation algorithm KG outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.

$\mathsf{Enc}(pk, m)$. On input a public key pk and a message m, Enc outputs a ciphertext C.

$\mathsf{Dec}(pk, sk, C)$. On input pk, sk and a ciphertext C, Dec outputs a message m or the error symbol $\perp$.

The two-party protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}$ is conducted between a user $\mathcal{U}$ and a decryptor $\mathcal{D}$:

$\mathsf{BlindDec}(\{\mathcal{U}(pk, C)\}, \{\mathcal{D}(pk, sk)\}) \to (m, \mathsf{nothing})$. On input pk and a ciphertext C, an honest user $\mathcal{U}$ outputs the decryption m or the error symbol $\perp$. The decryptor $\mathcal{D}$ outputs $\mathsf{nothing}$ or an error message.

We now present the standard definition of adaptive chosen ciphertext security for public key encryption.

Definition 3.2 ($\mathsf{IND\text{-}CCA2}$) A public key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is $\mathsf{IND\text{-}CCA2}$ secure if every *p.p.t.* adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ has advantage $\leq \nu(\lambda)$ in the following experiment.

$\mathsf{IND\text{-}CCA2}(\Pi, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$
$(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$
$(m_0, m_1, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_{dec}(pk, sk, \cdot)}(pk)$ s.t. $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$
$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; c^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(pk, m_b)$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}'_{dec}(pk, sk, \cdot)}(c^*, z)$
Output b'

Where $\mathcal{O}_{dec}$ is an oracle that, on input a ciphertext c, returns $\mathsf{Dec}(pk, sk, c)$ and $\mathcal{O}'_{dec}$ operates identically but returns $\perp$ whenever $c = c^*$. We define $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in the above game by:

$$|\mathbf{Pr}[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

Additional security properties. A secure blind decryption scheme must possess the additional properties of *leak-freeness* and *blindness*. Intuitively, leak-freeness [29] ensures that an adversarial User gains no more information from the blind decryption protocol than she would from access to a standard decryption oracle. Blindness prevents a malicious Decryptor from learning *which* ciphertext a User is attempting to decrypt, even when the Decryptor can induce failures in the protocol. Let us now formally state these properties.

Definition 3.3 (Leak-Freeness [29]) A protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}$ associated with a PKE scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is *leak free* if for all *p.p.t.* adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, there exists an efficient simulator $\mathcal{S}$ such that for every value λ, no *p.p.t.* distinguisher D can distinguish the output of Game Real from Game Ideal with non-negligible advantage:

Game Real: Run $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ and publish pk. As many times as D wants, $\mathcal{A}$ chooses a ciphertext C and atomically executes the $\mathsf{BlindDec}$ protocol with $\mathcal{D}$:
$\mathsf{BlindDec}(\{\mathcal{U}(pk, C)\}, \{\mathcal{D}(pk, sk)\})$. $\mathcal{A}$'s output (which is the output of the game) includes the list of ciphertexts and decrypted plaintexts.

Game Ideal: A trusted party runs $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ and publishes pk. As many times as D wants, $\mathcal{S}$ chooses a ciphertext C and queries the trusted party to obtain the output of $\mathsf{Dec}(pk, sk, C)$, if $C \in \mathcal{C}$ and $\perp$ otherwise. $\mathcal{S}$'s output (which is the output of the game) includes the list of ciphertexts and decrypted plaintexts.

In the games above, BlindDec and Dec are treated as atomic operations. Hence D and $\mathcal{A}$ (or $\mathcal{S}$) may communicate at any time except during the execution of those protocols. Additionally, while we do not explicitly specify that auxiliary information is given to the parties, this information must be provided in order to achieve a sequential composition property.

Definition 3.4 (Ciphertext Blindness) Let $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{U}}(pk, C)$ be an oracle that, on input a public key and ciphertext, initiates the User's portion of the BlindDec protocol, interacting with an adversary and ultimately producing an internal result which we denote by $m \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(pk, C)$. A protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}(\mathcal{U}(\cdot,\cdot)\ \mathcal{A}(\cdot,\cdot))$ is Blind secure if every *p.p.t.* adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3)$ has advantage $\leq \nu(\lambda)$ in the following game.

$\mathsf{Blind}(\mathsf{BlindDec}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$
$(pk, C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda)$
$b \leftarrow \{0,1\}; z' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{U}}(pk,C_b),\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{U}}(pk,C_{b-1})}(z)$
$m_b \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(pk, C_b); m_{b-1} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(pk, C_{b-1})$
Output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_3(z')$

We define $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in the above game as: $|\Pr[b' = b] - 1/2|$. Note that a stronger notion of blindness is *selective-failure* blindness, which was proposed by Camenisch *et al.* [16]. While our constructions do not natively achieve this definition, in section 4.2 we discuss techniques for achieving this stronger definition.

We thus arrive at the following definition.

Definition 3.5 (CCA2-secure Blind Decryption) A blind decryption scheme Π = (KG, Enc, Dec, BlindDec) is IND-CCA2-secure if and only if: (1) (KG, Enc, Dec) is IND-CCA2-secure, (2) BlindDec is leak free, and (3) BlindDec posses the property of ciphertext blindness.

4 Constructions

In this section we present a new blind decryption scheme that is secure under the Decision Linear and Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumptions in bilinear groups.

4.1 An Efficient Blind Decryption Scheme

We now present our blind decryption scheme BCS, and prove its security under the Decision Linear and Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumptions. BCS is based on a variant of Cramer-Shoup that was proposed by Shacham [52], with significant extensions to permit blind decryption.

The core algorithms. Figure 4.1 details the algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, which are responsible for key generation, encryption and decryption respectively. BCS encrypts elements of $\mathbb{G}$, which may necessitate an encoding scheme from other message spaces (see *e.g.,* [3]). Ciphertexts consist of 24 elements of $\mathbb{G}$ plus two element of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. While at first glance these ciphertexts may seem large, note that the scheme can be instantiated in asymmetric bilinear settings such as the MNT group of elliptic curves [44], where group elements can be represented in as little as 170 bits at the 80-bit security level. In this setting we are able to achieve a relatively ciphertext size of approximately 5100 bits. While this is large compared to RSA, a 640-byte per file overhead is quite reasonable for many practical applications.

Also note that in our description the KG algorithm samples a unique set of bilinear group parameters γ for each key; however, it is perfectly acceptable for many keyholders to share the same group parameters.

$\mathsf{BCS.KG}(1^\lambda)$

1. Sample $\gamma = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, g \in \mathbb{G}) \leftarrow \mathsf{BMsetup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Choose $g, g_1, g_2, g_3, v', d', u'_1, \ldots, u'_5 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$, and $x_1,\ x_2,\ x_3,\ y_1,\ y_2,\ y_3,\ z_1,\ z_2,\ z_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.
3. Compute:

$$\begin{array}{lll} c_1 \leftarrow g_1^{x_1} g_3^{x_3} & d_1 \leftarrow g_1^{y_1} g_3^{y_3} & h_1 \leftarrow g_1^{z_1} g_3^{z_3} \\ c_2 \leftarrow g_2^{x_2} g_3^{x_3} & d_2 \leftarrow g_2^{y_2} g_3^{y_3} & h_2 \leftarrow g_2^{z_2} g_3^{z_3} \end{array}$$

4. Output $pk = (\gamma,\ g,\ g_1,\ g_2,\ g_3,\ c_1,\ c_2,\ d_1,\ d_2,\ h_1,\ h_2,\ v',\ d',\ u'_1,\ \ldots,\ u'_5)$, $sk = (x_1,\ x_2,\ x_3,\ y_1,\ y_2,\ y_3,\ z_1,\ z_2,\ z_3)$.

$\mathsf{BCS.Enc}(pk, m \in \mathbb{G})$.

1. Select $\alpha, r_1, r_2, c, \psi \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Construct a FS keypair (vk_1, sk_1) and a second "workalike" keypair (vk_2, sk_2) as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} vk_1 \leftarrow (\gamma, g, g^\alpha, v', d', g_1, g_2, g_3, g, g, u'_1, \ldots, u'_5, 5) & vk_2 = (\gamma, g, g^\psi, v', d', g, g^c, 1) \\ sk_1 \leftarrow (vk_1, \alpha) & sk_2 = (vk_2, \psi, c) \end{array}$$

   Next, compute the ciphertext as:

$$\begin{array}{llllll} u_1 \leftarrow g_1^{r_1} & u_2 \leftarrow g_2^{r_2} & u_3 \leftarrow g_3^{r_1+r_2} & e \leftarrow m \cdot h_1^{r_1} h_2^{r_2} & v \leftarrow (c_1 d_1^\alpha)^{r_1} \cdot (c_2 d_2^\alpha)^{r_2} & \\ & & vk \leftarrow g^\alpha & e_1 \leftarrow u_1^\alpha & e_2 \leftarrow u_2^\alpha & e_3 \leftarrow u_3^\alpha \quad f_1 \leftarrow g^c \quad f_2 \leftarrow g^\psi \\ & & \sigma_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{FS.Sign}\,(sk_1, (r1, r2, r1+r2, c, \psi)) & & \sigma_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{FS.WASign}\,(sk_2, e) & \end{array}$$

2. Output $C = (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk, e_1, e_2, e_3, f_1, f_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$.

$\mathsf{BCS.Dec}(pk, sk, C)$.

1. Parse sk and C as above. Assemble $vk_1 \leftarrow (\gamma,\ g,\ vk,\ v',\ d',\ g_1,\ g_2,\ g_3,\ g,\ g,\ u'_1,\ \ldots,\ u'_5,\ 5)$ and $vk_2 \leftarrow (\gamma, g, f_2, v', d', g, f_1, 1)$. Now, verify the relations:

$$\begin{array}{r} \{\hat{e}(vk, u_i) = \hat{e}(e_i, g)\}_{i\in[1,3]} \ \wedge \\ \mathsf{FS.Verify}\,(vk_1, (u_1, u_2, u_3, f_1, f_2), \sigma_1) \ \wedge \ \mathsf{FS.Verify}\,(vk_2, (e), \sigma_2)\} \end{array} \tag{1}$$

2. If this check fails, output $\perp$. Otherwise, parse $sk = (x_1,\ x_2,\ x_3,\ y_1,\ y_2,\ y_3,\ z_1,\ z_2,\ z_3)$ and select $z \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Compute the decryption m' as:

$$m' = e \cdot \frac{(u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3})^z}{u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3} \cdot v^z} \tag{2}$$

Figure 1: Key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms for the BCS scheme.

Correctness. By substitution it is relatively easy to show that the public key encryption scheme $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is correct, *i.e.,* that $\mathsf{Dec}(pk, sk, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, m)) = m$ with probability 1 for valid inputs pk, m. We leave the details for Appendix B.

The Blind Decryption Protocol. The blind decryption protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}$ with respect to BCS is shown in Figure 2. The protocol requires a multiplicatively homomorphic $\mathsf{IND\text{-}CPA}$-secure encryption scheme, which we instantiate using the Linear Encryption scheme (LE) of Boneh *et al.* [7].[8]

The protocol employs the homomorphic property of LE to construct a a two-party implementation of the Dec algorithm, with ZKPoKs used to ensure that both the User and Decryptor's contributions are correctly formed. Note that for security reasons it is critical that the Decryptor *re-randomize* the ciphertext that it sends back to the User in its portion of the protocol. In the LE scheme this can be accomplished by multiplying a ciphertext with a fresh encryption of the identity element.

[8] In asymmetric bilinear groups where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, this can easily be replaced with Elgamal encryption, resulting in a significant efficiency improvement.



Figure 2: The Blind Decryption protocol $\mathsf{BlindDec}(\mathcal{U}(pk, C), \mathcal{D}(pk, sk)) \rightarrow (m', \mathsf{nothing})$. For compactness of notation we represent the homomorphic operation on two LE ciphertexts $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$ using simple multiplicative notation ($\mathbf{c}_1\mathbf{c}_2$), and exponentiation by a scalar z as $\mathbf{c}_1^z$.

4.1.1 Security

Let Π_{ZK} be a zero-knowledge (and, implicitly, witness indistinguishable) proof system secure under the Decision Linear assumption (possibly in the Common Reference String model). In the following theorems we will show that if the Decision Linear and Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold in $\mathbb{G}$ then $\mathsf{BCS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{BlindDec})$ implemented with Π_{ZK} is a secure blind decryption scheme in the sense of Definition 3.5. This requires three separate arguments: (1) that the algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ comprise an IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme, (2) that the BlindDec protocol is leak-free, and (3) that BlindDec is selective-failure blind.

Theorem 4.1 *If the Decision Linear and Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold in $\mathbb{G}$ and Π_{ZK} is secure under the Decision Linear assumption in the standard model (resp. CRS model), then* (BCS.KG, BCS.Enc, BCS.Dec) *comprise an* IND-CCA2*-secure public-key encryption scheme secure in the standard model (resp. CRS model).*

We present a proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix C.1. Here we will summarize the intuition behind the proof, which employs techniques from the Cramer-Shoup variant due to Shacham [52]. Our simulator knows the scheme's secret key, and can use it to answer decryption queries. The exceptions to this rule are certain queries related to the challenge ciphertext. Specifically, we must be careful with queries that are (a) "malformed", *i.e.,* the queried value $v \neq u_1^{x_1}e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2}e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3}e_3^{y_3}$, or that ($b$) embed the value vk^* from the challenge ciphertext.

Note that equation (2) of the Dec algorithm ensures that malformed ciphertexts decrypt to a random element of $\mathbb{G}$, so the first case is easily dealt with in our simulation. The adversary cannot maul the ciphertext

due to the presence of the checksum v. Thus it remains to consider well-formed ciphertexts with $vk = vk^*$. We argue that the challenge ciphertext itself is the only ciphertext that will pass all of our checks.

Intuitively our simulation accomplishes this by setting $vk = g^{\alpha^*}$ as the public key of a strongly unforgeable OTS which is secure under the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption. In principle we use this key to sign the challenge ciphertext components $(u_1^*, u_2^*, u_3^*, e^*)$, which produces all of the remaining components of the ciphertext. When the adversary submits a decryption query with $vk = vk^*$ we can be assured that the query is identical to the challenge ciphertext, as any other result would require the adversary to forge the OTS.

It remains to argue that our OTS is indeed unforgeable. This is non-trivial, since the OTS is based on an F-signature where signing operates on messages of the form $m_1, \ldots, m_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, but verification can be conducted given $g^{m_1}, \ldots, g^{m_n} \in \mathbb{G}$. In principle our simulation can select the elements u_1^*, u_2^*, u_3^* such the simulator knows their discrete logarithm base g. Unfortunately, even this is not sufficient, since our simulator does not always know the discrete logarithm of the value e^* which is based on a message value chosen by the adversary. The core intuition of our proof is to give two separate simulations: in one the signing key α^* is known and we can *simulate* the signature, producing a correctly-distributed (but not unforgeable) signature over arbitrary group elements. In the second simulation the signing key is unknown: the simulator chooses $(u_1^*, u_2^*, u_3^*, e^*)$ at random such that it knows the discrete logarithm (base g) of each value. Although the resulting ciphertext does not encrypt either m_0 *or* m_1, an adversary is unable to detect this condition under the Decision Linear assumption.

Theorem 4.2 *If the Decision Linear assumption holds in* $\mathbb{G}$ *and* Π_{ZK} *is secure under the Decision Linear assumption, then the* BCS *protocol* BlindDec *is leak-free.*

We present a proof sketch of Theorem 4.2 in Appendix C.2. Intuitively this proof is quite simple: we show that for any real-world adversary $\mathcal{A}$ we can construct an ideal-world adversary $\mathcal{S}$ that, whenever $\mathcal{A}$ initiates the BlindDec protocol, operates as follows: (1) $\mathcal{S}$ uses the extractor for the PoK system to obtain $\mathcal{A}$'s requested ciphertext, (2) queries this result to the trusted decryption oracle, (3) re-blinds and returns the correctly formulated result to the adversary, simulating the necessary ZK proofs. We show that under the Decision Linear assumption no *p.p.t.* distinguisher can differentiate the output of $\mathcal{S}$ playing the Ideal-World game from the output of $\mathcal{A}$ in the Real-World game except with negligible probability.

Theorem 4.3 *If the Decision Linear assumption holds in* $\mathbb{G}$ *and* Π_{ZK} *is secure under the Decision Linear assumption, then the* BCS *protocol* BlindDec *is* SFB*-secure.*

We sketch a proof of Theorem 4.3 in Appendix C.3.

4.2 Extensions

Tag-Based Encryption. Tag-Based Encryption (TBE) allows encryptors to apply a tag (label) to each ciphertext. This tag is used during the decryption process. The BCS construction is in fact natively based on a TBE scheme, but this functionality is lost in the final construction. We now show that with some minor extensions to the KG, Enc, Dec algorithms (and BlindDec) it is possible to retain the scheme's TBE functionality.

Our modified KG algorithm selects additional sk elements x_1', x_2', x_3', y_1', y_2', y_3' and computes new pk elements $c_1' = g_1^{x_1'} g_3^{x_3'}$, $c_2' = g_2^{x_2'} g_3^{x_3'}$, $d_1' = g_1^{y_1'} g_3^{y_3'}$, $d_2' = g_2^{y_2'} g_3^{y_3'}$. When an encryptor calls the tag-based encryption algorithm $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, m, \bar{t})$ with $\bar{t} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as the tag value, Enc computes an additional check value $\bar{v} = (c_1' d_1'^{\bar{t}})^{r_1} \cdot (c_2' d_2'^{\bar{t}})^{r_2}$ and adds $\bar{v}, \bar{t}$ to the existing BCS ciphertext. To compute $\mathsf{Dec}(pk, sk, C, \bar{t}')$, the modified decryption algorithm selects $z' \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and computes m' as:

$$e \cdot \frac{(u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3})^z (u_1^{x_1' + \bar{t}' y_1'} \cdot u_2^{x_2' + \bar{t}' y_2'} \cdot u_3^{x_3' + \bar{t}' y_3'})^{z'}}{u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3} \cdot v^z v'^{z'}}$$

We omit the revised BlindDec protocol and security proofs, but simply observe that an adversary's probability of "forging" a correct tag $\bar{v}$ is roughly the same as their probability of forging the original check v. By the

arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 4.1 this probability is negligible. We refer the reader to the work of MacKenzie *et al.* [42] for additional intuition and formal TBE security definitions.

Selective-failure blindness. Camenisch *et al.* [16] propose a stronger definition of blindness (for signature schemes) that they refer to as "selective-failure" blindness. Intuitively, this definition captures the notion that an adversarial Decryptor might attempt to induce failures in the protocol (*e.g.,* by generating malformed ciphertexts) in order to deprive the User of privacy. Unfortunately our protocols do not natively achieve this definition because the Decryptor can create ciphertexts with an improperly formed check value v. Unfortunately, due to the nature of our scheme this check cannot be verified independently by the user. One potential solution to this problem is to add to each ciphertext a non-interactive proof that v is correctly formed. Such a proof could be constructed using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the random oracle model, or using the Groth-Sahai system in the Common Reference String model. Note that this approach would not require any changes to the blind decryption protocol.

5 Applications

Blind decryption has applications to a number of privacy-preserving protocols. Several applications have already been proposed in the literature, *e.g.,* [47, 25]. Below we will propose two specific applications motivated by our construction.

Privacy-preserving Distributed Filesystems. Many organizations are responding to the difficulty of securing data in a distributed network, where storage locations can include semi-trusted file servers, desktop computers and mobile devices. An increasingly popular approach is to employ cryptographic access control to restrict and monitor file access in these environments. In this approach (*e.g.,* [1]), access control is performed by encrypting files at rest; authorized users contact a centralized server in order to decrypt them when necessary.

Once concern when centralizing access control is the high value of the query pattern. Specifically, knowing *which* content a user is accessing may by itself leak confidential information. For example, the pattern of file accesses by executives during a corporate merger can have enormous financial value if placed in the right hands. While it is desirable to centralize access control, it can therefore be important to restrict this centralized party from learning which information is being managed. While these goals seems contradictory, Coull *et al.* [21] and Camenisch *et al.* [13] recently showed how to construct sophisticated access control mechanisms using anonymous credentials. In these protocols a server provides strong, and even *history-dependent* access control without ever learning user's access pattern.

Our blind decryption protocols are amenable to integration with these access control techniques. In particular, by extending BCS to include *encryption tags* as in Section 4.2, data can be explicitly categorized and policies can be defined around these categories.

Oblivious Transfer with Public Contribution. In an adaptively-secure k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol ($\mathsf{OT}^N_{k\times 1}$) a Receiver obtains up to k items from a Sender's N-item database, without revealing to the Sender *which* messages were transferred. There has been much recent interest in $\mathsf{OT}^N_{k\times 1}$ [16, 29, 30, 35, 48, 21, 13], as it is particularly well suited for constructing privacy-preserving databases in which the user's query pattern is cryptographically protected (this is critical in *e.g.,* patent and medical databases).

For practical reasons, there are situations in which it is desirable to distribute the authorship of records, particularly when database updates are performed offline. Unfortunately, existing $\mathsf{OT}^N_{k\times 1}$ protocols seem fundamentally incapable of supporting message contributions by third parties without the explicit cooperation of the Sender.

Our blind decryption constructions admit new $\mathsf{OT}^N_{k\times 1}$ protocols. While this is interesting in and of itself, these protocols can be extended to permit *public contribution*. Intuitively, the contributors achieve this by simply encrypting their messages using the Enc algorithm under the Sender's public key and sending the resulting ciphertexts directly to the Receiver. The Receiver can then obtain up to k decryptions by running $\mathsf{BlindDec}$ with the Sender. Proving this intuitive protocol secure under a strong simulation-based

definition [16, 29] requires some additional components that are easily achieved using the techniques available to us. We leave such a construction for the full version of this work.

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A Security of our Multi-Block F-signature

In this section we address the security of our one-time F-signature, which was presented in Section 2.4. We will first informally describe the security game. For some fixed parameters γ, n (with n polynomial in $|\gamma|$) an adversary is given pk and allowed to request one signature σ on an n-block message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n)$ of the adversary's choosing. We say that the scheme is strongly F-unforgeable if no p.p.t. adversary has more than a negligible probability of outputting $(g_1^{m_1'}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n'}, \sigma')$ where $\mathsf{Verify}(pk, g_1^{m_1'}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n'}, \sigma') = 1$ and $(g_1^{m_1'}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n'}) \neq (g_1^{m_1}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n})$ or $\sigma' \neq \sigma$.

Theorem A.1 *Let $n = \text{poly}(|\gamma|)$ for some polynomial function $\text{poly}(\cdot)$. The scheme $\mathsf{FS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Verify})$ is F-unforgeable if the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in $\mathbb{G}$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the Type II case of the proof presented by Hohenberger and Waters in [34]. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that forges FS with non-negligible probability, we construct a solver $\mathcal{B}$ for Flexible Diffie-Hellman that also succeeds with non-negligible probability.

$\mathcal{B}$ takes as input a Flexible-Diffie Hellman tuple (γ, g, g^a, g^b) and selects a message index $i^* \xleftarrow{R} [1, n]$. It next chooses $y_v, y_d, x_v, x_d \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and sets $v = g^{bx_v} g^{y_v}$ and $d = g^{-bx_d} g^{y_d}$. It sets $u_{i^*} = g^b$ and for all $i \neq i^*$, selects $x_{u_i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and sets $u_i = g^{x_{u_i}}$. Finally, for $i = 1$ to n it selects $x_{g_i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and sets $g_i \leftarrow g^{x_{g_i}}$. Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs $pk = (g, g^a, v, d, g_1, \ldots, g_n, u_1, \ldots, u_n, n)$ to $\mathcal{A}$. When $\mathcal{A}$ queries on $m_1, \ldots, m_n$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $r = (x_d - m_{i^*})/x_v$. It outputs the signature σ as:

$$\sigma_1 = \prod_{i=1, i\neq i^*}^{n} g^{a x_{u_i} m_i} \cdot (g^a)^{y_v r + y_d}, \quad g^{a x_{g_1} m_1}, \quad \ldots, \quad g^{a x_{g_n} m_n}, \quad u_1^{m_1}, \quad \ldots, \quad u_n^{m_n}, \quad r$$

Note that the signature above is correctly distributed. When $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a valid forgery $(g_1^{m_1'}, \ldots, g_n^{m_n'}, \sigma')$, $\mathcal{B}$ parses σ' as $(\sigma_1', e_1', \ldots, e_n', f_1', \ldots, f_n', r')$ and computes $g^{m_{i^*}'} = (g_{i^*}^{m_{i^*}'})^{1/x_{g_{i^*}}}$. If either of the following conditions are true, $\mathcal{B}$ aborts: (1) $g_{i^*}^{m_{i^*}'}$ is equal to $g_{i^*}^{m_{i^*}}$ and simultaneously $r = r'$ or (2) $g^{m_{i^*}'} (g^{r'})^{x_v} g^{-x_d} = 1$. Note that since i^* is random and independent of the adversary's view, the probability of case (1) is at most $\frac{n-1}{n}$ since the forgery's message vector must be different in at least one position from the adversary's query, or alternatively the value r' must be different than the r provided in σ. Note that $e_1, \ldots, e_n, f_1, \ldots, f_n$ are uniquely determined by $m_1', \ldots, m_n'$ (and their structure is checked by Verify), thus the only way σ' can differ from σ is when $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \neq (m_1', \ldots, m_n')$ or when $r \neq r'$.

Condition (2) occurs with probability at most $1/p$. As in [34], we observe that the values x_v and x_d are hidden by blinding factors y_v and y_d, respectively. The adversary could hypothesize that $m_{i^*} + x_v r - x_d = 0$, however, there are p possible (x_v, x_d) pairs that satisfy this equation and each of them are equally likely. Information-theoretically, the adversary can output a pair $(g^{m_{i^*}'}, r')$ satisfying $g^{m_{i^*}'} (g^{r'})^{x_v} g^{-x_d} = 1$ with probability at most $1/p$. Thus, if $\mathcal{A}$ forges with probability ϵ then with probability at least $\frac{\epsilon p}{n(p-1)}$ $\mathcal{B}$ will output a solution to the Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem (w, w^{ab}) as:

$$w = g^{m_{i^*}'} (g^{r'})^{x_v} g^{-x_d}, \quad w^{ab} = \frac{\sigma_1'}{\prod_{i=1, i\neq i^*}^{n} e_i'^{x_{u_i}} \cdot g^{a r' y_v} (g^a)^{y_d}}$$

Note that this works, since if σ' passes the verification checks then we can re-write σ_1 as:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_1' &= \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} u_i^{m_i'} \cdot v^{r'} d \right)^a = \left(\prod_{i=1, i\neq i^*}^{n} g^{x_{u_i} m_i'} \cdot (g^b)^{m_{i^*}'} (g^{b x_b} g^{y_v})^{r'} (g^{-b x_d} g^{y_d}) \right)^a \\ &= \prod_{i=1, i\neq i^*}^{n} g^{a x_{u_i} m_i'} \cdot g^{a(y_v r' + y_d)} \cdot g^{ab(m_{i^*}' + x_v r' - x_d)} \end{aligned}$$

We conclude by addressing three issues that were raised earlier in this work:

1. *Compatiblilty with the Groth-Sahai proof system.* The security proofs for our blind decryption protocol use a knowledge extractor to obtain σ from $\mathsf{WIPoK}\{(\sigma) : \mathsf{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) = 1\}$. Unfortunately, the Groth-Sahai proof system does not permit the extraction of elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and thus cannot obtain the component r. To solve this problem, the prover can translate r into a pair of values $(h_1, h_2) = (g^{ar}, g^r)$, and add the additional condition $\hat{e}(h_1, g) = \hat{e}(h_2, g^a)$ to the verification equation. While the extracted signature still differs from the original, by observation it is easy to see that the pair $(g^{ar'}, g^{r'})$ can stand in for r' in the reduction above, thus even this modified signature is unforgeable under the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption.

2. *Simplification for single-block messages.* For the special case of single-block messages (where $n = 1$) we will completely omit the value e_1 from the signature, since this value is not required in signature verification or in the proof.

3. *Non-distinct g_i values.* The KG algorithm selects $g_1, \ldots, g_n$ randomly from $\mathbb{G}$. In fact, one or more of these values can be the same, provided that they are chosen at random. The modifications to the security proof above are straightforward.

4. *Security of "workalike" signatures.* In section 2.4 we presented workalike algorithms that can "sign" messages of the form $(g_1, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$. It does not seem easy to adapt the security proof above to admit this type of signing. Where these algoritihms are used in our blind decryption schemes we address their security explicitly in the corresponding proofs.

B Correctness of BCS

To show that the scheme is correct, we will first describe the following alternative decryption procedure.

1. First, verify the relations described in equation (1) of the Dec algorithm, outputting $\perp$ if the relations are not satisfied.
2. Next, verify that $u_1^{x_1} e^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e^{y_3} = v$.
3. If this comparison is satisfied, output $m' = \frac{e}{u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}}$. Otherwise, output a random element of $\mathbb{G}$.

To demonstrate why this alternative decryption is equivalent to the Dec algorithm, observe that we can re-write equation (2) of the Dec algorithm as follows:

$$m' = \frac{e}{u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}} \cdot \left(\frac{u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3}}{v} \right)^z$$

When $u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3} \neq v$ then for $z \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ the equation $(\frac{u_1^{x_1} e^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e^{y_3}}{v})^z$ evaluates to a random element of $\mathbb{G}$, and thus m' is also random. When the equality holds, we obtain $m' = \frac{e}{(u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3})}$.

It remains to show that this alternative decryption is correct. By substitution we can see that an honestly-generated ciphertext will always satisfy the check of equation (1). Similarly, it will satisfy $u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} \sigma_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} \sigma_3^{y_3} \stackrel{?}{=} v$:

$$\begin{aligned} & u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3} \\ = & (g_1^{r_1 x_1} g_1^{r_1 \alpha y_1}) \cdot (g_2^{r_2 x_2} g_2^{r_2 \alpha y_2}) \cdot (g_3^{(r_1+r_2) x_3} g_3^{(r_1+r_2) \alpha y_3}) \\ = & g_1^{r_1 x_1} g_3^{r_1 x_3} g_1^{r_1 \alpha y_1} g_3^{r_1 \alpha y_3} \cdot g_2^{r_2 x_2} g_3^{r_2 x_3} g_2^{r_2 \alpha y_2} g_3^{r_2 \alpha y_3} \\ = & (c_1 d_1^{\alpha})^{r_1} \cdot (c_2 d_2^{\alpha})^{r_2}) = v \end{aligned}$$

Finally, when all of the previous checks succeed, the output m is correctly distributed:

$$\frac{e}{(u_1^{z_1}u_2^{z_2}u_3^{z_3})} = \frac{m \cdot h_1^{r_1}h_2^{r_2}}{(u_1^{z_1}u_2^{z_2}u_3^{z_3})} = \frac{m \cdot (g_1^{z_1}g_3^{z_3})^{r_1}\,(g_2^{z_2}g_3^{z_3})^{r_2}}{g_1^{r_1 z_1}g_2^{r_2 z_2}g_3^{(r_1+r_2)z_3}} = m$$

C Proofs of Security

C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1

Proof. The BCS scheme is based on the scheme of Shacham [52], and the first twelve paragraphs of this proof directly quote that proof [52, §3]. To avoid unnecessary detail we will refer the reader to the above proof for some of the analysis of abort probabilities. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary with non-negligible advantage in the IND-CCA2 security game. We show how to construct a solver for the Decision Linear or Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem using $\mathcal{A}$.

In the first case, let $\mathcal{B}$ be an algorithm that, given a Decision Linear instance $(\gamma, g_1, g_2, g_3, u_1, u_2, u_3)$, outputs 1 if $log_{g_3}u_3 = log_{g_1}u_1 + log_{g_2}u_2$ and 0 otherwise. As in the real KG algorithm, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses secrets $x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3, x_{u_1}, \ldots, x_{u_5}$, sets $(u_1, \ldots, u_5) = (g^{x_{u_1}}, \ldots, g^{x_{u_5}})$ and using γ, g_1, g_2, g_3 constructs the remainder of pk normally.

$\mathcal{B}$ answers $\mathcal{A}$'s decryption queries as in BCS.Dec using its knowledge of the secret key. When $\mathcal{A}$ submits the messages m_0, m_1 on which it wishes to be challenged, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$, sets $e \leftarrow m_b \cdot u_1^{z_1}u_2^{z_2}u_3^{z_3}$ and selects $\alpha, c, \psi \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. It constructs the following workalike signing keypairs:

$$vk_1 \leftarrow (\gamma, g, g^\alpha, v', d', g_1, g_2, g_3, g, g, u_1', \ldots, u_5', 5) \qquad vk_2 = (\gamma, g, g^\psi, v', d', g, g^c, 1)$$
$$sk_1 \leftarrow (vk_1, \alpha, x_{u_1}, \ldots, x_{u_5}) \qquad sk_2 = (vk_2, \psi, c)$$

And calculates the remaining ciphertext elements as:

$$e \leftarrow m_b \cdot u_1^{z_1}u_2^{z_2}u_3^{z_3} \qquad v \leftarrow u_1^{x_1+\alpha y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2+\alpha y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3+\alpha y_3} \qquad vk \leftarrow g^\alpha$$
$$e_1 \leftarrow u_1^\alpha \qquad e_2 \leftarrow u_2^\alpha \qquad e_3 \leftarrow u_3^\alpha \qquad f_1 \leftarrow g^c \qquad f_2 \leftarrow g^\psi$$
$$\sigma_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{FS.WASign}(sk_1, (u_1, u_2, u_3, g^c, g^\psi)) \qquad \sigma_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{FS.WASign}(sk_2, (e))$$

$\mathcal{B}$ supplies to $\mathcal{A}$ the challenge ciphertext ciphertext $C^* = (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk, e_1, e_2, e_3, f_1, f_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$, and responds to $\mathcal{A}$'s further decryption queries as before. Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs its guess b'. If $b = b'$, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0.

If $\mathcal{A}$ has a different advantage in guessing the bit b when $\mathcal{B}$ is run with a Linear tuple $(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, g_3^{r_1+r_2})$ and when $\mathcal{B}$ is run with a random tuple $(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, \eta \in_R \mathbb{G})$, we obtain a distinguisher for the Linear problem. In the remainder of this sketch, we establish that in the first case $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage is nonnegligible, whereas in the second case $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage is negligible.

Note that in both cases, the public key and decryption queries are distributed as in the real protocol. However, when $\mathcal{B}$ is run with a Linear tuple, we can show that challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed. Specifically, u_1, u_2, u_3 are correctly formed, and all remaining elements are formed as in the real protocol. Though they are computed using alternative formulae, it is easy to verify that e, v are also correctly distributed.

When $\mathcal{B}$ is run with a random tuple, the bit b remains independent of $\mathcal{A}$'s view except with negligible probability. Let "$log(\cdot)$" stand for "$log_{g_1}(\cdot)$" and define $t_2 = log(g_2)$ and $t_3 = log(g_3)$. Consider the three elements (z_1, z_2, z_3) of the secret key. The public key values h_1 and h_2 constrain these to line on the line at the intersection of the planes defined by $log(h_1) = z_1 + t_2 z_3$ and $log(h_2) = t_2 z_2 + t_3 z_3$. A decryption query for a valid ciphertext whose first three components form a valid Linear tuple $(u_1', u_2', u_3') = (g_1^{r_1'}, g_2^{r_2'}, g_3^{r_1'+r_2'})$ will allow the adversary to obtain $((u_1')^{z_1}(u_2')^{z_2}(u_3')^{z_3})$, but in this case we have

$$log\,((u_1')^{z_1}(u_2')^{z_2}(u_3')^{z_3}) = (r_1')(z_1 + t_3 z_3) + (r_2')(t_2 z_2 + t_3 z_3),$$

which is linearly dependent on values already known to the adversary. This analysis does not hold if the decryption oracle accepts a ciphertext whose first three elements do not form a linear tuple. Below we show that the decryption oracle accepts such invalid ciphertexts only with negligible probability.

Now consider the challenge ciphertext $C^* = (u_1,\ u_2,\ u_3,\ e,\ v,\ vk,\ \dots)$. Let $u_1 = g_1^{r_1}, u_2 = g_2^{r_2}$ and $u_3 = g_3^{r_3}$, with $r_3 \neq r_1 + r_2$ (except with negligible probability). The message in e is blinded by $u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}$, which has the discrete logarithm:

$$log(u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}) = r_1 z_1 + r_2 t_2 z_2 + r_3 t_3 z_3 = (r_1)(z_1 + t_3 z_3) + (\Delta r)(t_3 z_3),$$

where $\Delta r = r_3 - r_1 - r_2 \neq 0$. To an adversary who has received decryption queries only for valid ciphertexts, this value is independent of its view. This means that M_b is independent of the adversary's view even given e.

It remains only to show that, given that through query i the decryption oracle has not accepted an invalid ciphertext, the probability that it accepts an invalid one at query $i+1$ is negligible. We restrict our consideration to decryption queries made by $\mathcal{A}$ after it has seen the challenge ciphertext, since the challenge ciphertext gives the adversary strictly more information about the values $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3)$ by which BCS.Dec checks ciphertext validity. Let $C'_i = (u'_1,\ u'_2,\ u'_3,\ e',\ v',\ vk',\ e'_1,\ e'_2,\ e'_3,\ f'_1,\ f'_2,\ \sigma'_1,\ \sigma'_2)$ be the i^{th} query, which satisfied the pairing-based checks of the Dec algorithm. We consider the following three cases:

1. $(u_1, u_2, u_3, e, vk) = (u'_1, u'_1, u'_3, e', vk')$, but $v \neq v'$. In this case $\mathcal{B}$ can simply return a random element of $\mathbb{G}$, since v as calculated in generating C^* is the only correct checksum value for (u_1, u_2, u_3, e) and the Dec equation (2) embeds the term $(\frac{v}{v'})^z$ for some random $z \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

2. $(u_1, u_2, u_3, e) \neq (u'_1, u'_1, u'_3, e')$ and $vk \neq vk'$. In this case $\mathcal{B}$ will return a random element of $\mathbb{G}$, the correct checksum value $(u_1'^{x_1} e_1'^{y_1} \cdot u_2'^{x_2} e_2'^{y_2} \cdot u_3'^{x_3} e_3'^{y_3})$ is independent of $\mathcal{A}$'s view, and thus with all but negligible probability value v' will not pass the decryption check. We omit the full argument here, but refer the reader to [52, §3] for the details.

3. $C'_i \neq C^*$ and $vk = vk'$. We refer to this case as Event_Forge. Proving that this event occurs with at most negligible probability represents a new component of the proof. In Lemma C.1 below we show that an adversary who presents such a ciphertext implies a forger for the FS signature scheme presented in Section 2.4. Thus, if the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in $\mathbb{G}$ this condition must occur with at most negligible probability.

Based on the above, $\mathcal{A}$ has only a negligible probability of obtaining the decryption of an invalid ciphertext (or detecting an invalid response) after a polynomial number of decryption queries. This concludes our main proof. We now turn our attention to the following Lemma.

Lemma C.1 *If the Flexible Diffie-Hellman and Decision Linear assumptions hold in $\mathbb{G}$, then for all p.p.t. adversaries $\mathcal{A}$,* Event_Forge *will occur with probability negligible in λ.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a CCA adversary who, having received a challenge ciphertext of the form $C^* = (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, vk, \dots)$, where $u_1, u_2, u_3 \in_R \mathbb{G}$, issues a decryption query on $C' = (u'_1, u'_2, u'_3, e', vk', \dots)$ where $vk' = vk$ and yet $C' \neq C^*$.[9] If $\mathcal{A}$ makes such a decryption query with non-negligible probability, we show how to construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}'$ that uses $\mathcal{A}$ to solve the Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem or Decision Linear problem with non-negligible advantage.

Our primary strategy in this proof is to show that $\mathcal{A}$ can be used to construct a forger $\mathcal{B}'$ for the strongly unforgeable multi-block F-signature FS described in Section 2.4. By Theorem A.1 a forger for this scheme implies a solver for the Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem with related advantage. We refer the reader to the proof of Theorem A.1 for complete details.

A wrinkle in our proof is that the values that $\mathcal{B}'$ gives to $\mathcal{A}$ will not always be identically distributed to the real protocol. Thus we must show via a separate proof that under the Decision Linear assumption, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot

[9] Note that it does not matter if $\mathcal{A}$ makes this query before or after receiving C^*, both cases are acceptable for this proof.

distinguish this case (except with negligible probability). Let us now describe $\mathcal{B}'$, which runs $\mathcal{A}$ internally and interacts with a challenger playing the strong F-unforgeability game (see Section 2.4) instantiated with the one-time signature FS.

Simulation Setup. $\mathcal{B}'$ flips a coin and with probability 1/2 chooses one of two strategies below. Each strategy will embed a FS signature into a different portion of the ciphertext. In both strategies, $\mathcal{B}'$ will obtain a public key for the FS signature scheme, parse it to obtain group parameters γ, derive the BCS secret key $sk = (x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3)$ and compute the public parameters for the encryption scheme.

Strategy 1. $\mathcal{B}'$ fixes signature parameters $\gamma, n = 5$ and requests a FS verification key of the form $vk_1 = (g, g^\alpha, v', d', g_1, g_2, g_3, g, g, u'_1, \ldots, u'_5, 5)$. Note that the use of the non-distinct base elements (g_1, g_2, g_3, g, g) is a deviation from the scheme as it was defined in Section 2.4. However, in Appendix A we noted that the signature retains its security when using parameters of this form. $\mathcal{B}'$ computes $(c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, h_1, h_2)$ as in the normal key generation algorithm and outputs $pk = (\gamma,\ g,\ g_1,\ g_2,\ g_3,\ c_1,\ c_2,\ d_1,\ d_2,\ h_1,\ h_2,\ v',\ d',\ u'_1,\ \ldots,\ u'_5)$.

When $\mathcal{A}$ eventually submits challenge messages m_0, m_1, $\mathcal{B}'$ selects $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$, $r_1, r_2, r_3, c, \psi \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, computes $(u_1, u_2, u_3) = (g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, g_3^{r_3})$ and uses its knowledge of the secret key to compute $(e, v) = (m_b g_1^{r_1 z_1} g_2^{r_2 z_2} g_3^{r_3 z_3},\ u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3})$. It next queries the FS challenger on the message vector (r_1, r_2, r_3, c, ψ) to obtain the signature σ_1, and parses σ_1 to obtain (e_1, e_2, e_3). Finally it constructs $vk_2 = (\gamma, g, g^\psi, v', d', g_1, g^c, 1)$ and $sk_2 = (vk_2, \psi, c)$ and calculates $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{WASign}(sk_2, (e))$. It outputs the challenge ciphertext as:

$$C^* = (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk = g^\alpha, e_1, e_2, e_3, g^c, g^\psi, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$$

Note that the ciphertext above is correctly distributed, and embeds the FS signature σ_1 and a "workalike" signature σ_2. With overwhelming probability $(g_1, g_2, g_3, u_1, u_2, u_3)$ do *not* form a Linear tuple, but this is expected and in line with the conditions of $\mathsf{Event\_Forge}$. Ultimately $\mathcal{A}$ submits a valid query $C' \neq C^*$ of the form:

$$C' = (u'_1, u'_2, u'_3, e', v, vk, e'_1, e'_2, e'_3, f'_1, f'_2, \sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$$

If C' differs from C^* *only* in the components e' or σ_2 then $\mathcal{B}'$ aborts. Otherwise, it submits message vector $(u'_1, u'_2, u'_3, f'_1, f'_2)$ and signature σ'_1 as a forgery for the FS signature scheme. Note that (e_1, e_2, e_3) are determined by α and (u_1, u_2, u_3). The remaining elements represent the messages signed by σ'_1.

Strategy 2. $\mathcal{B}'$ fixes signature parameters $\gamma, n = 1$ and obtains a FS verification key which it parses as $vk_2 = (g, f_2, v', d', g, f_1, 1)$ (as above, this key uses a variant of the normal FS key generation algorithm). It selects $\rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3, x_{u_1}, \ldots, x_{u_5} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, sets $(g_1, g_2, g_3) = (g^{\rho_1}, g^{\rho_2}, g^{\rho_3})$, $(u'_1, \ldots, u'_5) = (g^{x_{u_1}}, \ldots, g^{x_{u_5}})$, and calculates the rest of the public key as in $\mathsf{BCS.KG}$. Next it hands $\mathcal{A}$ the public key $pk = (\gamma,\ g,\ g_1,\ g_2,\ g_3,\ c_1,\ c_2,\ d_1,\ d_2,\ h_1,\ h_2,\ v',\ d',\ u'_1,\ \ldots,\ u'_5)$.

When $\mathcal{A}$ eventually submits challenge messages m_0, m_1, $\mathcal{B}'$ selects $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$, $\alpha, x, r_1, r_2, r_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and queries the FS challenger on the single-message vector $(x + (\rho_1 r_1 z_1) + (\rho_2 r_2 z_2) + (\rho_3 r_3 z_3))$ to obtain the signature σ_2. It computes $(u_1, u_2, u_3) = (g_1^{r_1}, g_2^{r_2}, g_3^{r_3})$, $(e_1, e_2, e_3) = (u_1^\alpha, u_2^\alpha, u_3^\alpha)$, $e = g^x g^{r_1 z_1} g^{r_2 z_2} g^{r_3 z_3}$ and $v = u_1^{x_1} e_1^{y_1} u_2^{x_2} e_2^{y_2} u_3^{x_3} e_3^{y_3}$. Finally it assembles a "workalike" signature key $vk_1 \leftarrow (\gamma, g, g^\alpha, v', d', g_1, g_2, g_3, g, g, u'_1, \ldots, u'_5, 5)$ and $sk_1 = (vk_1, \alpha, x_{u_1}, \ldots, x_{u_5})$ which it uses to compute $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{WASign}(sk_1, (u_1, u_2, u_3, f_1, f_2)$. It outputs the challenge ciphertext:

$$C^* = (u_1, u_2, u_3, e, v, vk = g^\alpha, e_1, e_2, e_3, f_1, f_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$$

Note that the ciphertext above will pass the verification checks of Dec equation (1) but is incorrectly distributed, since e encrypts a random message g^x rather than m_0 or m_1. With the exception of this difference, and its reflection in the structure of the signature σ_2, the ciphertext is otherwise formulated correctly. Ultimately $\mathcal{A}$ submits a valid query C' of the form:

$$C' = (u'_1, u'_2, u'_3, e', v, vk, e'_1, e'_2, e'_3, f'_1, f'_2, \sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$$

where v and vk are as in the challenge ciphertext and yet $C' \neq C^*$. If C' is identical to C^* in the elements (e', σ_2') then $\mathcal{B}'$ aborts. Otherwise, it submits the message e' and signature σ_2' as a forgery for the FS signature scheme.

Abort probabilities. If we examine the abort conditions for both strategies, it becomes obvious that whenever $C' \neq C^*$ and both ciphertexts have tag vk then *one* of the strategies above will produce a forgery for FS. Let us momentarily pretend that the distributions of Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 are identical from $\mathcal{A}$'s point of view (though they clearly are not). If this were the case, then $\mathcal{B}'$'s probability of abort would be at most $1/2$, and in all other instances $\mathcal{B}'$ would output a forgery for FS. Thus, a successful adversary $\mathcal{A}$ implies a forger for FS, and consequently a solver for the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption that succeeds with non-negligible advantage. Under the Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption, $\mathcal{A}$'s probability of outputting an appropriate C' should be negligible, *i.e.,* $\mathbf{Pr}[\mathsf{Event\_Forge}] \leq \nu(\lambda)$.

If course this analysis is incomplete, since the distributions of Strategy 1 and 2 differ in the structure of the challenge ciphertext C^*. Thus it is possible that based on this difference $\mathcal{A}$ might construct its output C' to induce abort with probabilities significantly higher than $1/2$. To complete our analysis we will show that under the Decision Linear assumption, $\mathcal{A}$ *cannot* succeed at inducing an abort probability higher than $1/2 + \nu'(\lambda)$. The next several paragraphs will prove this, and thus conclude our proof.

Let us assume that $\mathcal{A}$ induces $\mathcal{B}'$ to abort with probability non-negligibly higher than $1/2$. If this is the case, then we can use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ that wins the IND-CCA2 game and yet does not trigger Event_Forge with more than negligible probability. Note that by the analysis that we have already given at the top of this section, such an adversary implies a solver for the Decision Linear assumption. Let us now describe $\mathcal{A}'$.

$\mathcal{A}'$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ and operates as follows: (1) it forwards $\mathcal{A}$'s decryption queries to the CCA challenger, (2) when $\mathcal{A}$ challenges on (m_0, m_1) $\mathcal{A}'$ picks $b \in_R \{0,1\}, x \in_r \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and queries the CCA challenger on (m_b, g^x). Finally (3) when $\mathcal{A}$ issues a query of the form $C' \neq C^*$, $\mathcal{A}'$ checks this ciphertext against the abort conditions of Strategy 1 and Strategy 2. It outputs 0 whenever Strategy 1 would abort, and 1 whenever Strategy 2 would abort.

Since these abort conditions can be publicly checked, $\mathcal{A}'$ does not actually need to submit C' to the CCA challenger, and therefore it will never submit a query to the CCA challenger that satisfies Event_Forge. Thus we can apply the reduction shown at the top of this section: when $\mathcal{A}'$ succeeds with non-neglible advantage, we obtain a solver for the Decision Linear problem that succeeds with non-negligible advantage.

It remains to show only that when $\mathcal{A}$ induces abort in $\mathcal{B}'$ with probability non-negligibly higher than $1/2$, then $\mathcal{A}'$ must win the CCA game with non-negligible advantage. To see this, observe that the only difference (from $\mathcal{A}$'s point of view) between $\mathcal{B}'$'s Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 is in the construction of the challenge ciphertext, and specifically the plaintext underlying it. If $\mathcal{A}$ causes $\mathcal{B}'$ to abort with probability non-negligibly higher than $1/2$ then it must by definition have some non-negligible advantage at distinguishing the two challenge ciphertext distributions. Since the distribution of the challenge ciphertext that $\mathcal{A}'$ produces is identical to $\mathcal{B}'$'s Strategy 1 (resp. Strategy 2) depending only on the bit selected by the CCA challenger, $\mathcal{A}$'s decryption queries can be used to predict this bit with non-negligible advantage.

Since we assume that the Decision Linear problem is hard, then by contradiction we have that $\mathcal{A}$ cannot induce $\mathcal{B}'$ to abort with probability non-negligibly higher than $1/2$, and this completes our proof.

C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2

Proof sketch. For all real-world adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we show how to construct an ideal-world adversary $\mathcal{S}$ such that under the Decision Linear assumption no p.p.t. D can distinguish the output of the Ideal and Real experiments except with negligible probability.

$\mathcal{S}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ internally, handing it pk output by the trusted party. Whenever $\mathcal{A}$ initiates the User's portion of the BlindDec protocol, $\mathcal{S}$ employs the knowledge extractor for $\mathcal{A}$'s WIPoK to obtain the components of the ciphertext being decrypted.[10] Assuming $\mathcal{A}$'s PoK is valid, $\mathcal{S}$ submits this ciphertext to the trusted party and

[10] Observe that the entire ciphertext consists of elements of the group $\mathbb{G}$. This is particularly important when using Groth-

receives a decryption m' in response. It returns $\mathbf{c}'' = \mathsf{LE.Enc}(pk_{\mathcal{U}}, m')$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and simulates the Decryptor's ZKPoK. If Π_{ZK} is secure under the Decision Linear assumption, then we can bound the combined probability that the extractor fails and that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes the simulated proof to at most a negligible value $\nu(\lambda)$. Thus it remains only to observe that when $\mathcal{A}$'s WIPoK validates, then distribution of $\mathbf{c}'$ is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution expected from a correct run of the BlindDec protocol.

C.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3

Proof sketch. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that wins the SFB game with non-negligible advantage ϵ. We show that $\mathcal{A}$ implies a solver $\mathcal{B}$ for the Decision Linear problem. $\mathcal{B}$ operates as follows. First, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs (pk, C_0, C_1). $\mathcal{B}$ selects $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and interacts with $\mathcal{B}$ by running $\mathcal{U}(pk, C_b)$ and $\mathcal{U}(pk, C_{b-1})$. Note that LE is IND-CPA-secure under the Decision Linear assumption and we assume that WIPoK is WI under the same. Clearly the two transcripts received by $\mathcal{A}$ thus far are computationally indistinguishable, and if not we can construct a distinguisher for the Decision Linear problem.

Finally, for each initiation of BlindDec, $\mathcal{A}$ returns a response of the form $\mathbf{c}''$ and a ZKPoK ensuring that $\mathbf{c}'$ is correctly formed (or $\perp$ in the event of failure). When $\mathcal{A}$ returns $\perp$ (or an invalid PoK) for one or both responses, it can predict game's final output and thus gains no further information from seeing it. When $\mathcal{A}$ returns $\mathbf{c}''$ with a valid ZKPoK, however, by the soundness property of the ZKPoK it is restricted to performing a correct decryption of either C_b or C_{b-1} (except with negligible probability, under the Decision Linear assumption). Once again, since $\mathcal{A}$ can predict the distribution of responses even without receiving the final output, it gains no new information from seeing the decryption (m_0, m_1).

Sahai NIZKs, as that proof system does not possess a knowledge extractor for $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.